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I disagree that determining whether provocation is a partial ex-
cuse or partial justification is important for criminal law. Although
this inquiry touches on critical issues about homicide law and
criminal responsibility generally, the question I think betrays a
misunderstanding of provocation doctrine. It presumes a yes or no
response to a question that can only be answered: both. Provoca-
tion is and always has been a compromise rule whose success
depends on its ability to appeal to all ideological constituencies,
and therefore will always-as long as it lasts-resist the final cate-
gorization that this question seeks. As long as provocation involves
an inquiry into reasonableness, it will include considerations of
justification. As long as it provides for mitigation of punishment
based on the difficulty of resisting temptations to violence inspired
by strong emotion, it will speak to considerations of excuse.
I disagree that emotionally-related cognitive dysfunction should
mitigate punishment for criminal homicide regardless of reasons
for emotion. That we can identify persons who are prone to mis-
perceive threat and respond with extreme violence where others
would not, that we can perhaps explain their special propensities
by environmental or genetic factors, does not, by itself, say any-
thing about whether such persons merit reduced punishment for
killing. Criminal responsibility should be constructed according to
the social and political function of criminal law here, which is to
resolve violent disputes nonviolently. Its decisions should depend
on the social-moral meaning of action, on the defendant's reasons
for action. Although this involves an assessment of the defendant's
choice, including reasons for emotion, judgment does not rely on
reconstructing the internal processes leading to the defendant's
decision. Criminal law and psychology have important, but difficult
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. My sincere thanks to Reid Grif-
fith Fontaine for inviting this response to his article and reaffirming that invitation even
after I warned that my response would likely be quite critical. This shows a commitment to
robust discussion that in academia is usually expressed more impressively in words than
action. I would also like to thank my research assistant Nicole Perreira for her assistance.
Finally my thanks to the participants in the January 2008 discussion on Manslaughter at the
American Association of Law Schools Conference in New York City, especially my fellow
panelists: Stephen Garvey, Ken Simons, and Caroline Anne Forell. Their thoughts on the
doctrine helped inform my own-which should not of course be confused with agreement
with what I say here.
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relations, which often become confused in the context of provoca-
tion because of the doctrine's explicit concern with strong
emotion.
I disagree that assessing reasons for emotion in provocation is
incoherent or inconsistent with mens rea analysis generally. Provo-
cation is best understood as taking standard mens rea analysis one
step beyond its usual inquiry. In addition to asking about why the
defendant acted as he or she did (the defendant's purpose or
awareness), we ask why the defendant was motivated to violence-
why the defendant was so angry or fearful as to kill the victim. This
approach can be justified substantively and is practically workable.
I. CATEGORIZING PROVOCATION AS PARTIAL EXCUSE
OR PARTIAL JUSTIFICATION: JUST SAY YES
Many scholars have debated whether provocation should be
considered a partial excuse or partial justification.' It's not hard to
see why. The doctrine of provocation has an extraordinarily rich
jurisprudence developed across many years and jurisdictions; its
treatment of emotion involves larger issues of criminal responsibil-
ity often implicated in defenses of both justification and excuse.
And yet, I do not find the question as standardly phrased particu-
larly useful. It assumes that we can discover what has never existed.
I imagine the matter this way. In some other-worldly interroga-
tion room, a fiercely-determined Scholar, dogged in pursuit of the
jurisprudential truth, leans over the bare table separating Scholar
from Doctrine and demands: "Okay, enough of the fun and games,
Provocation. Once and for all, the truth. Explain yourself. Do you
provide lesser punishment because the defendant's conduct or
passion was in some way justified? Or do you mitigate because
strong emotion, regardless of origin, makes self-control especially
1. Taking the side of partial excuses in a number of articles over the course of his
prolific career is Joshua Dressier. See, e.g., Joshua Dressier, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?:
Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. RJ v. 959 (2002) [hereinafter Dressier, Why
Keep the Provocation Defense?]; Joshua Dressier, Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?
51 MOD. L. REv. 467 (1988). For other examples of the partial excuse argument, see George
Mousourakis, Emotion, Choice and the Rationale of the Provocation Defense, 30 CAMBRIAN L. REv.
21 (1999); Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea : I-Provocation, Emotional Disturbance,
and the Model Penal Code, 27 B.C. L. REV. 243 (1986); Suzanne Uniacke, Emotional Excuses,
LAW & PHIL. 95 (2006). For partial justification arguments, see Andrew von Hirsch & Nils
Jareborg, Provocation and Culpability, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS (F.
Schoeman ed., 1987); Andrew Ashworth, The Provocation Doctrine, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292
(1976); John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, No Provocation Without Responsibility: A Reply to
MacKay and Mitchell, 2004 CRIM. L. REV. 213; Finbarr McAuley, Anticipating the Past: The De-
fense of Provocation in Irish Law, 50 MOD. L. REv. 133 (1987).
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difficult?" To which Provocation will smile and say: "Yes. Exactly. All
of the above."
A. Defining Partial Justification
Professor Fontaine frames the excuse/justification question us-
ing philosopher J.L. Austin's widely accepted distinction between
the two. A justification represents a judgment that the challenged
action was morally correct or acceptable in some sense. An excuse
represents a judgment that although the action was wrong, the ac-
tor should not be punished because he or she lacks some trait
critical for individual responsibility.
2
Professor Fontaine writes about provocation: "Presumably, for
the doctrine to be one of partial justification, it would demand a
higher standard than that of excuse, for it would mean that the
action of the killer is a partially morally good or right (or at least
partially acceptable) thing to do. But a person who successfully
argues provocation will be convicted of a serious felony: manslaugh-
ter. This is a crime of violence usually punished with a significant
prison sentence. All jurisdictions that recognize the doctrine clas-
sify a provoked killing as a serious offense. One does not get sent
to state prison for years and suffer all of the consequences of a se-
rious felony conviction for doing what society considers to be a
morally good, right or acceptable action. Nor, as I will argue below,
is modern provocation based on the judgment that a lesser amount
of violence was justified in the situation.
A common misdescription (and often misunderstanding) of
provocation is that it condones the defendant's act by equating it
with the conduct of a reasonable person. Law students often, and
courts on occasion, speak about provocation as requiring a judg-
ment that the defendant did as the reasonable person would do in
the situation.5 As many have noted, however, this is clearly incorrect
2. J. L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 1 (1956-57), reprinted
inJUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF ESSAIS 3 (Michael
L. Corrado ed., 1994); Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 1897 (1984).
3. Reid Griffith Fontaine, Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as Excuse Not
Justification, 43 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 27, 33 (2009).
4. In California for example, the maximum sentence for voluntary manslaughter,
without enhancements for aggravating factors such as use of a deadly weapon, is 11 years.
The minimum prison term is three years. CAL. PEN. CODE § 193(a) (2008).
5. The English Homicide Act of 1957 refers to "whether the provocation was enough
to make a reasonable man do as he did." English Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 3
(Eng.). Fontaine states early on: "Adequate provocation is considered to mean provocation by
FALL 2009]
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as a matter of law.6 Although the law's rhetoric of reasonableness
can be obscure at times, the law's position on the provoked defen-
dant's conduct is plain. He, or she, has committed a serious crime.
No matter how we define the reasonable person, the adjective de-
scribes a law-abiding individual. We do not expect a law-abiding
person to commit a felony, let alone a serious crime of homicidal
violence. Professor Fontaine is correct that a finding of provoca-
tion does not represent a judgment that the defendant's conduct
was in any sense morally acceptable.
B. Candidates forJustification: Lesser Violence, Justified Passion
If there is more to the justification versus excuse debate con-
cerning provocation than this-and the number of powerful legal
minds drawn to the question suggests there is-we need to under-
stand justification differently here. I see two possibilities: (1) the
defendant was justified in using some lesser amount of violence
against the victim; or (2) the defendant's motivating passion-his
or her fear or anger toward the victim-was justified. Neither con-
dition would justify killing, but then provocation law does not
either.
In his book on provocation, Jeremy Horder argues (rather per-
suasively to my mind) that provocation probably found its origins
in the first of these notions. In the 17th century when English gen-
tlemen commonly went about armed and were expected to defend
their (male) honor with violence, provocation represented a
judgment about situations where violence might be appropriate,
but only of a non-deadly variety. When the defendant suffered a
grave insult to honor, he was entitled to respond forcefully. The
original insult might take the form of significant violence, or it
might take a less violent but still gravely dishonorable form, such as
the tweaking of a nose or discovery of the physical act of adultery.
7
In all of these situations, the moral code of the day held that a gen-
tleman might properly respond to the insult with measured
violence. When a man responded to a grave, but non-deadly insult
with fatal violence, this was a crime, but provocation mitigated it
from murder to manslaughter.
the victim that would be sufficient to significantly undermine the rationality of a reasonable
person." Fontaine, supra note 3, at 30.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Roston, 986 F.2d. 1287, 1294 (9th Cir. 1993) (Boocheever,
J. concurring); Dressier, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 1, at 998.
7. JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 23-42 (1992).
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The modern doctrine may also be traced to an earlier rule
called chance medley which applied to fair fights between men re-
sulting in death. Again, while English criminal law prohibited the
use of deadly force in fights, it mitigated punishment for homicide
in a combat situation from a capital offense (murder) to a lesser
crime (manslaughter) in recognition that some level of non-deadly
violence might be warranted in defense of manly honor.8
So much for 17th century England: what about provocation to-
day?
As Horder argues, provocation can no longer be based on a 17th
century English gentleman's code of honor. Mere insults to honor,
no matter how grave, do not justify the use of significant violence. 9
As a result, the use of violence to defend one's honor must be con-
sidered an obsolete rationale for provocation. It cannot be the
basis for partial justification.
As for the use of non-deadly force in a fair fight, to the extent
that this justification survives into modern times, it should be con-
sidered in tandem with considerations of self-defense. To
understand its role in provocation, we need to explore the ever-
contested border between provocation and self-defense.
If an individual is threatened with what reasonably appears to be
unlawful, non-deadly force, the victim may respond with non-
deadly force."0 If the victim responds with excessive, meaning
deadly force and kills, however, self-defense will not exonerate."
Some jurisdictions recognize a partial defense of imperfect self-
defense, in which a killing motivated by an honest but unreason-
able belief in imminent deadly threat will result in a manslaughter
conviction. 2 For those jurisdictions that do not recognize this rule,
provocation may produce the same result through a determination
that a combination of anger and fear was justified.
Under provocation analysis, a decision maker might judge that a
reasonable person would also have experienced some mix of anger
and fear sufficient to make such a reasonable person sorely
tempted to deadly violence.13 Punishment would still be merited
8. For more on its historical development, see SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL:
RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER 128-34 (1998).
9. Although they remain powerful in certain subcultures and other nations.
10. SeeJOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 223 (5th ed. 2009).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 249-50.
13. Fear and anger can be difficult to disentangle both as psychological states and as
cognitive states. Having a reason to fear will also provide a reason to rage. Consider the
experience of being cut off by another driver in traffic. The flash of fear at the dangerous
maneuver becomes a surge of anger almost immediately. In the context of homicide, a victim's
FALL 2009]
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because: (a) defendant's fear did not rise to the level required for
self-defense (reasonable fear of imminent deadly force) and (b) no
matter how reasonable, anger alone cannot justify the use of
deadly force.
Because provocation's reach extends beyond situations where
the defendant faced a plausible threat of violence, response to
threat cannot provide a full explanation of the doctrine. Tradition-
ally provocation has also extended to fatal violence in response to
discovery of adultery and unlawful arrest.14 While there is real ques-
tion whether the latter (unlawful arrest) remains a viable claim,
and serious question about whether the former (discovery of adul-
tery) should, their recognition in standard rule statements suggests
a broader rationale. Following the reasoning set out so far, provo-
cation might be seen as resting on the reasonableness of the
defendant's passion at the time of the homicide. We might ask:
Would any reasonable person have experienced similarly over-
whelming anger and fear? Assuming we still consider unlawful
arrests and adultery to be serious wrongs that would provoke great
passion in the reasonable person, this approach would seem to
support categorizing provocation as a partial justification.",
C. Partial Excuse and the Effects of Strong Emotion
None of the foregoing establishes that provocation as
understood by appellate courts or applied by decision makers is
better classified as a partial justification than a partial excuse,
however. There exists support in statutes, court decisions and jury
instructions for the idea that provocation's mitigation of
punishment depends primarily on the effect of passion on rational
decision-making without much concern for the source of, or the
threatening the defendant gives him or her reason to fear and also reason for anger
supporting provocation.
14. See DRESSLER, supra note 10, at 536. Another standard category often cited by
courts is unlawful arrest. I doubt whether this remains a viable claim in contemporary law, as
the advent of professional law enforcement has eliminated the basic rationale for this claim.
Until the 19th century in England, there were no professional police, meaning that arrests
were undertaken by lay persons, leading to potential confusion between a lawful arrest and a
criminal assault or kidnapping. Modern claims of this type might also fall under the doc-
trines of complete or imperfect self-defense.
15. I have argued previously that a sounder foundation for provocation would be to
jettison reasonableness analysis and focus on reasons for emotion. I have proposed that
provocation should apply only when the defendant had good reason to be extremely angry
with the victim at the time of the homicide. PILLSBURY, supra note 8, at 142-46. Were I to
draft new rule language today, I would do so in terms of justified anger/fear to make clear
that both emotions, apart or in combination, can support mitigation.
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justification for, that passion. As Professor Fontaine argues, the
notion here is that the experience of strong emotion disturbs the
ordinary reasoning process, rendering the individual less capable
of evaluating choices, and therefore less responsible for the chosen
action that results. This sounds like a partial excuse based on the
effects of emotion regardless ofjustification for emotion or lesser
violence. The corrosive effect of strong emotion on moral restraint
(i.e., self-control) is absolutely central to the doctrine. Given this,
we cannot exclude excuse considerations from the doctrine.
And so, provocation has both justification and excuse dimen-
sions, making a final categorization difficult, if not impossible.
Which is why I do not find the original question especially useful.16
And yet there is an underlying question of real significance about
the treatment of emotion which the justification/excuse debate
touches upon. Does provocation require that the defendant have
good reason for anger and/or fear toward the victim at the time of
the homicide or is it enough that the defendant experienced any
strong emotion at the time of the killing that made self-control
particularly difficult?
Answering this question raises issues of both criminal responsi-
bility generally and provocation doctrine specifically. In terms of
responsibility, we must decide whether culpability in law is primar-
ily an individual, perhaps psychological, construct based on the
internal dynamics of a defendant's choice, or whether it is better
understood as an assessment of individual choice according to
moral-social norms. In doctrinal terms, the argument turns on how
much we see provocation's reasonableness norm as a universal,
moral-social standard and how much an individualized, psycho-
logical-normative standard. It is to these questions that we now
turn.
II. PROVOCATION AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Most fundamentally and most controversially, I disagree with
Professor Fontaine's view of criminal responsibility. Before explor-
ing those disagreements I must offer an important caveat, however.
Because Professor Fontaine's concepts of criminal responsibility
and culpability are not explicitly articulated in his article, I will be
working from suggestive references. I may be reading him wrong.
16. For another argument that the justification/excuse debate on provocation does
not make sense-because the real issue is our understanding of emotion-see Dan M. Ka-
han & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. Rav.
269,318-21 (1996).
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To the extent I argue against positions that Professor Fontaine
does not hold, I invite his correction. The discussion that follows I
hope will be useful regardless, though, because in all instances I
argue against positions that may be found elsewhere in the litera-
ture on provocation and other aspects of criminal culpability and
responsibility.
Early on, Professor Fontaine writes: "In its most serious form,
provocation interpretational bias may be functionally limiting such
that the reactive aggressor is able only to 'read' the ambiguously
provocative situation at hand as one that is seriously wrongful or
otherwise offensive."' 7 Later he writes: "[O]ne who is psychologi-
cally biased toward interpreting certain kinds of ambiguous or
'open' social situations as unjust and harmful may become no less
emotionally aroused, and therefore functionally limited, than do
the types of heat of passion killers that have been discussed thus
far."8 In these and other passages, consistent with many others who
argue for provocation as a partial excuse, Professor Fontaine seems
to locate mitigation of punishment in a diminished capacity for
deliberative reason, in the way that strong emotion reduces the
defendant's ability to deliberate fully. I read in Professor Fontaine's
article as well a suggestion that provocation provides mitigation of
punishment because of a sympathetic character flaw. Finally, there
are suggestions that this doctrine, which takes particular account of
the effects of emotion on decision making, requires a psychologi-
cal understanding of certain human behavior.
In these features, I identify three problems which I label respon-
sibility temptations, because I think each involves an attractive
conception of responsibility that in the end proves problematic for
criminal law. I believe these are temptations to be recognized and
resisted. They are, in the order in which they will be discussed: the
naturalistic temptation, the character temptation, and the capacity
temptation.
In a moment I will take up each of these in turn, but before do-
ing so want to take a moment to consider criminal responsibility in
its largest sense. How should we start to think about criminal re-
sponsibility? My argument is that the choice of a starting point will
strongly influence how we see criminal responsibility and particu-
lar rules for culpability.
17. Fontaine, supra note 3, at 31.
18. Id. at 40-41.
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A. Criminal Responsibility: Beginning with
Criminal Law's Function
The usual starting place for discussions about criminal responsi-
bility is the individual and the individual's experience of choice.
Recalling and reflecting upon our own choice experiences, we
imagine the choice experiences of others in different situations. In
this respect, most contemporary philosophies of responsibility are
agent-focused, concerned with the individual's experience of-and
capacity for-rational choice. The central challenge is how to
make responsibility fair in view of the individual's choice capacities.
Beginning the study of criminal responsibility this way leads to a
search for general principles of responsibility that will apply across
many situations and responsibility contexts. It makes criminal re-
sponsibility a subset of moral philosophy, developed by the usual
methods of philosophic inquiry. The discussion will involve testing
general principles by particular hypotheticals in which the author
has full information about an individual's choice process. All theo-
ries are judged by their fairness according to a general conception
of individual rational choice.
I think the starting point for any study of criminal responsibility
should be the function of the criminal law. Criminal law is after all
our subject, not philosophy or psychology. With respect to crimes
such as homicide, criminal law must provide nonviolent solutions
to violent disputes. The criminal justice system exists to respond to
serious wrongdoing in a way that prevents and precludes private
revenge.' 9 This political and social function makes criminal respon-
sibility potentially distinct from other forms of individual
responsibility."
Criminal responsibility is an essentially legal concept. This means
that it cannot be understood independent of its legal function.
Criminal responsibility is not so much a particular subtype or
application of moral philosophy as its own normative genus, with
its own criteria for success or failure. In the United States, criminal
law constitutes a set of legislatively-enacted and judicially
interpreted rules setting out fundamental conduct prohibitions for
a highly heterogeneous population that must be applied by lay
19. Jared Diamond, Vengeance is Ours, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 21, 2008, at 74 (describ-
ing contemporary tribal violence in New Guinea).
20. See Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 321
(2002); George Fletcher, The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory, 88 CAL. L. Rv. 687,
697-700 (2000). But see PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAw AND MORALITY 12-15 (2002)
(arguing that law might be seen as a primary source of responsibility concepts rather than a
field where philosophic principles are applied, often imperfectly).
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persons acting as jurors. Criminal responsibility must take account
of these features and needs.
To fulfill its dispute resolution function, American criminal law
must address the social meaning and experience of crime. The le-
gal system's norms and verdicts must make moral sense to decision
makers and the public alike. I believe this suggests some basic cri-
teria for principles and rules of criminal responsibility.
From a public perspective, criminal law is about crime. It is
about chosen conduct harmful to individuals and society. I believe
this means that criminal responsibility should be action-focused,
assessing the wrongfulness of prohibited conduct according to the
reasons for the conduct and its consequences. Reasons and conse-
quences provide the social meaning of crime, to which society
officially responds-assuming prosecution and conviction-with its
own action statement of criminal punishment.
Criminal law must be morally based, but this morality is rela-
tional rather than universal. By this I mean that criminal law sets
minimum expectations for how persons in society should interact.2
In a democracy, it determines how we are responsible to each
other for our acts, and occasionally our omissions to act. It is con-
structed for a particular society and time. It makes no claim to
fairness (or should make no such claim) outside of particular so-
cial expectations. Its source of norms is not theological, scientific,
or even philosophic, though each of these may prove influential.
The functional perspective on crime also has implications for
epistemology. Criminal responsibility should depend primarily on
observable conduct and its consequences. As a responsibility struc-
ture created from social (political and legal) processes and
answerable to society generally, its norms and its verdicts must be
socially transparent. They must be comprehensible at some social
distance. As a result, criminal law's decisions should turn on the
observable actions of individuals-and their consequences-rather
than on the internal dynamics of choice.
Does modern criminal law in the United States always meet
these criteria? Certainly not. Do these criteria provide a full ac-
count of criminal law norms? Certainly not. These criteria do,
however, give us some basis for critique of other approaches to re-
sponsibility frequently found in the literature and relevant to
questions of provocation.
21. SeeJohn Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, I BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 575, 593-94 (1998) (ar-
guing that excuses from criminal liability are based on minimal social expectations).
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B. The Naturalistic Temptation
Throughout his article, Professor Fontaine argues that what he
calls the social cognitive bias of certain individuals should support
mitigation of punishment when it influences the decision to kill.
The notion seems to be that facts about psychological functioning
affect culpability because psychological functioning reveals the na-
ture of the defendant's choice, a choice which determines liability.
The problem is a familiar one. To what extent should the insights of
behavioral science shape our judgments of criminal responsibility?
The temptation, especially strong if we begin with an agent-centered
concept of responsibility, is to believe that scientific observations
about the dynamics of decision making must directly inform respon-
sibility. The notion here is that criminal responsibility is a natural
concept, depending on discoveries concerning the human condi-
tion and human behavior.
Understanding that criminal law is fundamentally about resolv-
ing disputes takes us in a different direction. We see that criminal
responsibility is a social construction rather than a natural con-
cept.2 2 By holding persons responsible for wrongdoing we create
accountability; responsibility is our uniquely human contribution
to the world. As a result, scientific study of human behavior may
provide critical information that will inform responsibility judg-
ments, but such study cannot prove or disprove responsibility
principles. Its information about what human beings do can tell us
much about what persons will do-science's predictive powers are
potentially impressive here-but criminal law is more about expec-
tation than prediction. We set standards that we know some
persons will not meet and that some probably cannot meet. And
yet the setting of those standards remains essential to the work of
criminal law.
I have elsewhere argued that to the extent there is an overarch-
ing principle behind criminal responsibility, it is our effort to find
meaning in life.22 When we assess wrongdoing we are assessing the
meaning expressed by the conduct of the accused according to the
reasons for which it was taken. This interpretation of meaning de-
pends on reading individual choices in social context. As to
meaning itself, science can tell us something about what humans
find meaningful, but meaning itself is not a natural subject. It is
22. See CANE, supra note 20, at 66; Stephen J. Morse, Thoroughly Modern: Sir James
Fitzjames Stephen On Criminal Responsibility, 5 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 505, 509 (2008) ("Responsi-
bility is a human construction .... ").
23. PILLSBURY, supra note 8, at 18-46; Samuel H. Pillsbtriy The Meaning of Deserved
Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character and Responsibility, 67 IND. L.J. 719 (1992).
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not subject to scientific proof or disproof. Whether life has mean-
ing or not cannot be assessed in any observer-independent
measurement.
The naturalistic temptation is not just about science, however.
We may identify another, related temptation to make criminal re-
sponsibility natural via philosophy. This is a temptation to which I
am certainly drawn. Perhaps we can, through rigorous philosophic
inquiry, discover first principles of fairness on which we may con-
struct all of criminal responsibility. If we think big enough, hard
enough, deep enough, we may discover a natural law or principle
that lies behind all of our agreed-upon precepts of individual re-
sponsibility. Prime candidates for such law or principle are various
conceptions of free rational choice.
Adequately addressing this conception of responsibility would
require more space than I have here, and more philosophic talent
than I can pretend to deploy. I simply want to suggest the possibil-
ity of law without such a metaphysical superstructure. We don't
need a metaphysics of fully fair or free choice, because criminal law
is about the very practical, social, and political business of resolving
critical disputes between citizens. Courtrooms run today and have
run for centuries without a complete general conception of how
responsibility is fair according to every individual's situation and
capacity.
Modern criminal liability today does not require full could-have-
done-otherwise freedom to choose. It does not excuse for internal
compulsion. Nor does it require proof of the capacity to appreciate
moral reasons. Proof of ordinary rationality-that the individual
acted for morally comprehensible reasons prohibited by law-is
sufficient. The meaning-action approach, which I have advocated
previously, is consistent with this limited view of criminal responsi-
bility. As a result, it is likely to be (and has been) rejected by
scholars who believe that a metaphysics of choice is foundational
for criminal law. But although we academics are wont to dream
metaphysical dreams while our intellectual ambitions often run to
the grandest of conceptual schemes, I must ask whether we need a
complete metaphysics of choice to do criminal law. Do I need a
metaphysics of music to appreciate the work of Eric Dolphy, Ben
Harper, or Jean Sibelius, to cite three favorites? 24 Do I need a
metaphysics of love to comprehend what I feel for my children and
24. E.g., ERIC DOLPHY, OUT THERE (Prestige/New Jazz 1982); BEN HARPER & THE IN-
NOCENT CRIMINALS, LIVE FROM MARS (Virgin 2001); NEEME JARVI, THE GOTHENBURG




wife? Might there not be wisdom in focusing on the practice itself,
its function, and our historical experience of it to ground our un-
derstanding? Obviously I think so.2 5
C. The Character Temptation
Professor Fontaine argues for mitigation on behalf of "the cog-
nitively-biased heat of passion killer [who] (a) did not cause his
cognitive bias, and (b) could not have reasonably foreseen how
said bias would contribute to his reactive killing."2 This constitutes
mitigation based on a disposition to particular thoughts, feelings
and actions: in other words, a character trait. Just as we might
blame persons for having certain character traits, so we might ex-
cuse them for having certain traits. And again, taking an agent-
centered general approach to responsibility, we may construct par-
tial or complete excuses for character traits that inspire, impel or
compel wrongdoing-assuming that the formation of those traits
was not the fault of the individual.2 ' Taking a functional approach
to criminal responsibility emphasizes the character of actions
rather than the character of the actor, however.28
As I have argued, criminal responsibility is fundamentally rela-
tional in that it orders relations between persons in society. It is not
about character judgment; it does not render judgment on the
25. I do not pretend that this is a full argument sufficient to carry the propositions ex-
pressed here. It is more in the nature of a provocation or suggestion than a proof. Here I
can at least claim the company of some other scholars who have recently argued for a more
pragmatic approach to criminal law scholarship. For examples, see Kyron Huigens, On Aris-
totelian Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff 18 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 465, 465 &
nn.l-2 (2004).
26. Fontaine, supra note 3, at 32.
27. And assuming that we could reliably assess responsibility for the character trait as
part of the legal process. For another example of a character view of provocation, see Mou-
sourakis, supra note 1, at 26-28. The literature on character, as relevant to criminal
responsibility, is complex and beyond the scope of this discussion. For examples advocating
the relevance of character to basic criminal responsibility, see Peter Arenella, Character
Choice, and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Character to our Moral Culpability Judgments, 2 Soc.
PHIL. & POL'y 59 (1990). For an account of character's relevance to the wrongness of par-
tir,,lr ntct Hnioenq cunn nnte 25. at 484-89. Particularly good on the imoossibilitv of a
complete separation of character and act in criminal law and punishment are Gardner, supra
note 21, at 575 and James Q. Whitman, Making Happy Punishers, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2698,
2711-14 (2005) (reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST,
SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004)).
28. For other critiques of character analysis in criminal responsibility, see Fletcher, su-
pra note 20, at 699-700; Gardner, supra note 21, at 576-78 (criticizing excuse for conduct
that is "out of character"); Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results and Criminal Responsibility, 2004
U. ILL. L. REv. 363, 374-78. See alsoJEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING EVEN: FORGIVENESS AND
ITS LIMITS 43-47, 106-08 (2003); Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Punishing Hatred and
Prejudice, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1129-38 (2004).
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goodness or badness of persons. It concerns what particular indi-
viduals do and how others may be harmed as a result. In this
regard criminal law applies a much more modest conception of
responsibility than is often understood. In criminal law we do
not-or at least I believe we should not-act as God and pass final
judgment on a life or character. The only clear exception in cur-
rent law lies in capital punishment, which is its own story and own
problem. It is true that in judging the meaning of action we judge
the character of that action and therefore say something about the
defendant's character. But the point of criminal judgment should
be to judge action, not character.
D. The Capacity Temptation
Finally, and probably most importantly, the strong implication of
Professor Fontaine's argument is that defendants who suffer social
cognitive bias lack full capacity for deliberative decision-making.
Predisposed to perceive situations as threatening that others would
not, such individuals lack the ability to see the reality that others
would, triggering powerful emotions that make restraint from vio-
lence especially difficult.
Concerns with capacity inform a wide variety of responsibility
concepts in the literature on criminal responsibility. One concern
is with volitional capacity: individuals must have the ability to
choose to do otherwise or their choice is not free and therefore
not responsible. Just as we excuse for external compulsion in du-
ress, so we should excuse or mitigate responsibility when a
defendant's choice is internally compelled. Much of the partial ex-
cuse literature concerning provocation at least alludes to this
concept, with discussions of "explosive" emotions and other
mechanistic views of responsibility.
30
There is another form of capacity theory that is likely more cen-
tral to Professor Fontaine's argument, which may be termed
29. Again I must emphasize that this states my conception of an ideal criminal law.
Many controversial features of criminal law are character-based, including a wide range of
harsh recidivist offenses and special features for the treatment of sex offenders.
30. See Dressier, Why Keep the Provocation Defense, supra note 1, at 986. Dressier also
speaks of the provoked person's "impaired capacity for self-control." Id. at 978. For a critique
of what they see as a tendency to the mechanistic view of emotion in provocation, as op-
posed to an evaluative view of emotion, see Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 16, at 305-23.
For a critical discussion of volition analysis in criminal law, see Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrolla-
ble Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1054-74 (2002); Christopher Slobogin, The
Integrationist Alternative to the Insanity Defense: Reflections on the Exculpatory Scope of Mental Illness
in the Wake of the Andrea Yates 7al, 30 AM.J. CRIM. L. 315, 320-23 (2003).
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rationality-capacity. It is the idea that no person should be held
criminally responsible-or in the case of provocation fully crimi-
nally responsible-if he or she lacks full capacity to comprehend
the wrongness of conduct. In contemporary philosophy, individual
responsibility is often said to depend on responsiveness to reasons.
The individual must have the capacity to respond to moral reasons
in order to be held blameworthy for a particular wrongful act.31
My objections to grounding criminal responsibility in capacity
assessment, whether volitional or rationality-capacity, are twofold:
(1) such discourse seeks information we cannot reliably obtain
through observation; and (2) it draws from a universal conception
of fair choice rather than the relational assessment of action on
which criminal responsibility should rest.
My first, epistemological objection may well be the most impor-
tant, but I will state it only briefly here, for its significance is better
considered as part of the doctrinal discussion which will follow.
Both capacity for choosing otherwise and capacity for rationality
are states that can only be inferred from observable conduct. We
may be able to infer a defendant's ability to act or comprehend at
the time of the alleged crime based on his or her conduct on other
occasions, but this cannot be determinative. What matters is the
defendant's abilities at the time of the crime, not on other occa-
sions. Even with full information about the person and incident, it
is extraordinarily difficult to distinguish what a person could not
do from what he or she chose not to do.32 And criminal cases must
be decided on the basis of information that is far from perfect or
complete. Rules that demand evidence about internal decision dy-
namics-which capacity standards do-are likely to produce
decisions whose moral basis is opaque to the society at large.
My second objection is that because of its social and political
function, criminal responsibility should concern chosen action and
its reasons, not capacity for action or capacity for reasons. While I
cannot provide a full argument here, I can provide the beginnings
of such an argument. Simply put, while capacity conceptions of
responsibility appear consistent with much of current criminal law,
the tensions and gaps between those conceptions and current doc-
trine are telling. Where reason for action and capacity analysis
31. See JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A
THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1998); R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
MORAL SENTIMENTS (1994); R.A. Duff, Who is Responsible, For What, to Whom?, 2 OHIO ST.J.
CRIM. L. 441 (2005); StephenJ. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OH.
ST. J. CRI11. L. 289, 294-95 (2003). As applied to provocation, see id. at 296-97, 300-01;
Mousourakis, supra note 1, at 22-23.
32. See Slobogin, supra note 30, at 322-23.
FALL 2009]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform[
diverge, criminal law almost always prefers analysis of reasons. Con-
sidering criminal law's dispute resolution function, it is difficult to
imagine how it could be otherwise.3
Capacity theories would seem to preclude responsibility for con-
duct that is internally compelled, meaning where the individual
experiences powerful needs to engage in certain activities that
overwhelm countervailing concerns for the welfare of others or
self. There are many individuals currently punished by the criminal
law who, I think, could make a plausible argument of this sort. Per-
sons addicted to drugs or alcohol, those who engage in compulsive
stealing, fire setting or sexual offenses, all would seem to lack sig-
nificant capacity for free choice with respect to criminality under
this model. Nevertheless, capacity theory proponents generally de-
fend responsibility in such cases.34 It lies beyond the scope of my
efforts here to judge the merits of these defenses; it is sufficient to
note the potential tension between law and capacity theory here.
Instead I will focus on an even starker conflict between current
criminal law and capacity theory: the treatment of psychopaths.
When it comes to psychopaths, the conflict between capacity
theory and current law could not be more dramatic or basic. As
Stephen Morse has noted, most philosophers of law have argued in
recent years that psychopathy should excuse from criminal respon-
sibility. 35 Because psychopaths, by definition, lack the capacity for
empathy, the core trait needed for conscience and therefore moral
choice and moral responsibility, they are not culpable according to
capacity theorists. Whether they are seen as lacking a critical aspect
of rationality necessary for moral conduct, or lacking a motiva-
tional trait essential to being a member of the moral human
community, they appear to lack some capacity essential to moral
responsibility.36 Most who ground responsibility in individual emo-
tional and rational capacities for moral choice believe that
psychopaths should be treated like other non-responsible persons
who suffer from a mental illness that causes dangerous conduct.
33. For a differently stated but in many respects similar argument against capacity un-
derstandings of excuse in criminal law, see Gardner, supra note 21, at 579-85.
34. E.g., WALLACE, supra note 31, at 170-75; Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics and
Criminal Responsibility, 69 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 165 (2006).
35. Morse, supra note 22, at 521 ("Almost all philosophers think that psychopaths
should be excused because they lack the central rational capacities necessary to behave
well-the capacity to understand others' interests and the difference between right and
wrong."). See, e.g., R.A. DuFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 262-66 (1986); Jeremy Horder,
Pleading Involuntary Lack of Capacity, 52 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 298, 302-04 (1993); Maya Mei-Tal,
The Criminal Responsibility of Psychopathic Offenders, 36 ISR. L. REv. 103 (2002).
36. See Charles Fischette, Note, Psychopathy and Responsibility, 90 VA. L. REV. 1423, 1449-




Civil powers should be used to protect society from their dangers,
but they do not deserve punishment or moral condemnation in
the way that criminal law requires. 7
Current law holds otherwise. Psychopathy nowhere provides an
excuse from liability; its only legal relevance may be as an aggravat-
ing factor in sentencing." Nor are there, to my knowledge, any
credible efforts in the political realm in this country to grant ex-
cuse or mitigation based on psychopathy.
Now, it could be the criminal law that is wrong here. But when
we consider the essential social and political function of the crimi-
nal law, I would argue that the error must lie in the focus on
emotional/rational capacity. Psychopaths are exactly who most
challenge our social norms and therefore present the greatest so-
cial and moral threats to the community.39 There is a reason, and
not a trivial reason, that psychopaths, usually in the form of serial
killers, are the favorite villains of Hollywood crime pictures. Their
rejection of moral limitation is rational in the ordinary moral
sense. They pursue their own aims, their own pleasure and power,
in ways that are recognizably and standardly human, though taken
to selfish extremes. They represent extreme examples of individual
rejection of social-moral norms and challenges to social order.
That they may not be able to choose otherwise in a psychological
sense does not matter to criminal responsibility because their cho-
sen actions so strongly challenge moral-social norms. Their
relational responsibility could not be clearer. In this they seem, to
me, to be much the same as compulsive arsonists, thieves and sex
offenders, individuals whose rational wrongs demand punishment.
Unlike the insane, whose conduct stems from irrational percep-
tions of the world and therefore may be attributed to irrational
reasons, the psychopath's amorality makes sense to the rest of us.
The psychopath lives according to a morally comprehensible, but
reprehensible, philosophy: only I count. The criminal law ex-
presses our profound disagreement in concrete terms: conviction
and punishment.
37. E.g., Antony Duff, Psychopathy and Moral Understanding, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 189 (1977);
Morse, supra note 30, at 1072-73.
38. See Robert Schopp, Two-edged Swords, Dangerousness, and Expert Testimony in Capital
Sentencing, 30 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 57, 66-67 (2006); Lisa Ells, Note, Juvenile Psychopathy:
The Hollow Promise of Prediction, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 158, 185-207 (2005).
39. See generally DAVE CULLEN, COLUMBINE (2009) (discussing psychopath Eric Harris);
JACK OLSEN, THE MISBEGOTTEN SON: A SERIAL KILLER AND His VICTIMS: THE TRUE STORY
OF ARTHURJ. SHAWVCKOSS (1993).
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E. Moving to Doctrine: Basic Criteria for Criminal Rules
The preceding discussion of criminal responsibility has been
relatively abstract. We must now apply its learning to criminal doc-
trine. What does the function of criminal responsibility tell us
about criteria for rules of law, especially provocation? I suggest
three basic criteria relevant to provocation: 1) the rules must turn
on readily observable information about human conduct; 2) they
must express clear moral norms; and 3) they must be susceptible of
universal application regardless of group status.
The information criterion stems from both basic requirements
of criminal responsibility (discussed previously) and from the nature
of American criminal litigation. In the U.S. courtroom, one basic
source of information about culpability-the defendant-is consti-
tutionally restricted. Defendants cannot be compelled to testify.'
Rules that presume or demand information about the internal deci-
sion processes of the defendant, not readily observable by others,
are simply unworkable. If interpreted strictly, rules that demand
such psychological evidence will undercut the legitimate needs of
law enforcement. If interpreted broadly, they will not reliably guide
decision-makers.4
Rules of criminal law must be morally clear, meaning that their
norms must be apparent to lay persons. Assuming we take their
role seriously (and certainly that is not always the case), jurors must
comprehend the rules of decision from very basic jury instructions.
Their actual deliberations are secret and largely unregulated. Rules
that turn on expert psychological determinations should be sus-
pect because they are inconsistent with the experience and role of
jurors. The normative clarity of criminal rules is also important for
the larger legitimacy of criminal law in a democratic society-to its
social and political function. Respect for criminal law depends
primarily upon respect for its norms and if these are unclear or
appear contradicted by decisions, criminal law's function is sub-
verted.
Rules of criminal law must be susceptible of universal applica-
tion, meaning that they should not invite or permit different
readings according to group status such as gender, race, or class.
This uncontroversial proposition is nevertheless worth stating ex-
40. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
41. The law of premeditation might be seen as illustrative, with premeditation either
being so broadly interpreted as essentially to provide no legal guidance (that is, no content
independent of the mens rea of purpose to kill) or its proof requirements become so oner-
ous that they exclude cases involving the highest level of culpability. See PILLSBURY, supra
note 8, at 100-06.
[VOL. 43:1
Misunderstanding Provocation
pressly because while accepted in principle, the possibilities for its
violation in practice remain manifold.
III. PROVOCATION DOCTRINE: TRADITIONAL V. PSYCHOLOGICAL
VIEWS OF REASONABLENESS
Finally we are ready to talk about basic provocation doctrine and
its most important element, the requirement that the passion ex-
perienced by the defendant be in some sense reasonable. To
simplify considerably, we can identify two general approaches to
reasonableness in provocation law today, what may be called the
traditional and the psychological. Professor Fontaine favors the
psychological. I favor the traditional. After describing these two
approaches, I will discuss their doctrinal implications using three
sets of problem cases to illustrate.
Under the traditional view of provocation, reasonableness
represents an objective, social-moral standard for provoking events
and the emotions they inspire. We look to see whether the
reasonable person would have been similarly impassioned in the
situation and whether sufficient time elapsed from the original
wrong until the time of the homicide such that a reasonable person
would have calmed down. Those jurisdictions which impose
categorical requirements for provoking events present the clearest
examples-though not the only examples-of the traditional view.42
Such jurisdictions recognize certain categories of provoking events
as potentially sufficient for mitigation, the most important of which
(i.e., most common) is a significant physical assault on the
defendant or a loved one. The notion is that even if the defendant
was overcome by passion as a result of the victim's conduct, that
conduct must be such as to similarly impassion the reasonable
person. Legally speaking, this requires a provoking act within one
of the predetermined categories. This approach to provocation
requires moral-social assessment of the reasons for the defendant's
emotion and therefore is consistent with the justification side of
the doctrinal debate.
Under the traditional approach, provocation is effectively re-
stricted to the passions of anger and fear. The inquiry almost always
concerns whether the reasonable person would have experienced a
42. DRESSLER, supra note 10, at 572-74.
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similar degree of anger/fear as did the defendant at the time of
the homicide.43
The psychological approach to reasonableness, exemplified by
the Model Penal Code's (MPC) rule of extreme emotional distur-
bance, envisions a more individualized and psychological
assessment of emotion. The MPC requires that the defendant have
killed under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance
for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse, which rea-
sonable explanation or excuse is assessed from the defendant's
own point of view. Putting aside what I and some others believe to
be the incoherence of this joining of objective reasonableness with
individualized psychological assessment,44 it is clear that the draft-
ers of the MPC meant to change traditional reasonableness analysis
significantly. It is more focused on the defendant's actual experi-
ence of choice and his or her individual choice-capacity
impairment than traditional reasonableness assessment contem-
plates.45
Jurisdictions that adopt the psychological approach place no re-
striction on the type of emotion experienced. The emotion simply
must be strong enough to disturb reason, to interfere with the or-
dinary operation of conscience. We must take account of the
strength and effect of the individual defendant's emotions on or-
dinary decision-making. But that's not all.
43. One question here is whether the law should consider a defendant's individual his-
tory of victimization independent of the interaction with the victim. See, e.g., Stuart M.
Kirschner, Thomas Bartlett & GaryJ. Galperin, The Defense of Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 10
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 102, 118 (2004) (holding in favor of defendant who claimed
provocation when he killed a man who solicited him for sex; the defendant had been sexu-
ally abused as a teen). A similar issue arises in self-defense. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d
41, 52 (N.Y. 1986) (reasoning that defendant's past victimization by persons other than the
victims may be relevant to assessing reasonable fear).
44. PILLSBURY, supra note 8, at 131-34; Norman J. Finkel, Achilles Fuming, Odysseus
Stewing and Hamlet Brooding: On the Story of the Murder/Manslaughter Distinction, 74 NEB. L.
REv. 742 (1995). But see Dressier, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 1, at 986-94
(defending the MPC's broader view of provoking circumstances and expressing general,
though not unqualified, support for the Code's greater individualization of the reasonable
person).
45. Some American jurisdictions that use common law language in their provocation
rules nevertheless follow the psychological view in their interpretation of reasonableness.
See, e.g., People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976). Current English law appears sympathetic
to the psychological view. SeeJeremy Horder, Between Provocation and Diminished Responsibility,
10 KING'S C. L.J. 143, 145-46 (1999). Nevertheless the debate in the United Kingdom con-
tinues, see Gardner & Macklem, supra note 1. and in other Commonwealth nations as well,
see Heather Douglas, Assimilation and Authenticity: The 'Ordinary Aboriginal Person' and the
Provocation Defence, 27 ADELAIDE L. REv. 199 (2006); Caroline Forrell, Gender Equality, Values




Even under the MPC, the defendant's emotion must be in some
sense reasonable to mitigate punishment. Defining this form of rea-
sonableness is difficult. It is not a purely objective, social-moral
standard; it is meant to be more sensitive to the particular situation
and psychology of the defendant than the traditional approach. Yet
there remains a normative reasonableness limitation that depends
on some assessment of ordinariness or understandability. The pre-
sumption here is that psychology, whether understood in its
scientific sense or in a more folk wisdom sense, will provide suffi-
cient norms for decision-making. It envisions the decision maker
accepting mitigation because, "I could imagine losing it just the
way he did," or "I know I've never felt like that, but I know some
people, regular people, might react that way." Conversely, the deci-
sion-maker might reject mitigation, deciding: "That's just too
extreme, too weird, too idiosyncratic to be reasonable."46
Reasonableness defined in this fashion creates potentially sig-
nificant proof problems in the courtroom, especially in its
apparent invitation to introduce expert psychological testimony.
Recall the earlier point about the importance of rules that con-
template decisions based on observable evidence. Proponents of
the psychological view of reasonableness uniformly place consider-
able trust in decision-makers, especially jurors, believing that their
life experience and judgment, applied to complex human interac-
tions, will produce more just results than would a more directive
rule."' It is worth noting, however, that even given broader discre-
tion, juries-and courts for that matter-will not necessarily accept
the invitation to read reasonableness in the more individualized
fashion that proponents envision.
46. See People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 1313 (N.Y 1980) (affirming trial court's re-
jection of EED defense where appellate court noted that the trial judge had found "that the
defendant's emotional reaction at the time of the commission of the crime was so peculiar
to him that it could not be considered reasonable so as to reduce the conviction to man-
slaughter"). For a rationality-capacity explanation of mitigation here, see Morse, supra note
31, at 300-01.
47. A test like EED that arguably centers on the internal dynamics of the defendant's
choice privileges evidence to which only the defendant has immediate access. Or, if we be-
lieve that psychologists or other mental health experts have special insight here, it would
privilege their testimony. For a critique of expert involvement and the MPC rule, see
WILLARD GAYLIN, THE KILLING OF BONNIE GARLAND (1982). See also Singer, supra note 1, at
322. Cf Kirschner, Bartlett & Galperin, supra note 43, at 130 (although generally supportive
of EED and expert testimony, questioning whether experts should give opinions about the
reasonableness of EED).
48. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5(a), at 62-63 (1980); Commonwealth v
Maher, 10 Mich. 212 (1862).
49. See Kirschner, Bartlett & Galperin, supra note 43, at 117 (arguing that, based on a
study of cases in one New York county, defendant's plausible fear of the victim was the most
important factor in prosecutor, judge and jury assessments of the reasonableness of EED);
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The real test for any rule of criminal law is how it resolves cases,
especially difficult or problem cases. Here I consider three sets of
cases: the first being Professor Fontaine's problem cases-instances
of cognitive-emotive dysfunction based on special sensitivity to
threat; the second, involving male-female violence in intimate rela-
tionships; and the third, involving defendants suffering from
diminished rationality.
A. Problem Cases I-Cognitive-Emotive Dysfunction
& Violent Predisposition
The traditional approach would place most cases of cognitive-
emotive dysfunction beyond provocation's reach. The psychologi-
cal approach would at least consider them for mitigation.
Concerning the perpetrators of this kind of violence, I finally
find a point of basic agreement with Professor Fontaine. He writes:
"In psychology, there is considerable empirical literature that
demonstrates that aggressive (or violent) individuals are biased in
favor of interpreting ambiguous provocations as definitively inten-
tional, hostile, and provocative. 50 His description of individuals
who are predisposed to read situations as threatening that others
would not, and are predisposed to respond violently, is also sup-
ported by the criminological literature.5' It is entirely consistent
with what we know about common patterns of reactive violence,
including reactive homicide, especially among young men. The
question is what this data about human psychology and behavior
means for the criminal law.
Professor Fontaine uses psychological terms (cognitive-emotive
dysfunction) to describe what could also be called a character trait.
It is a predisposition to perceive human interaction in a particular
way and to react in a particular way. It perceives more threats of
violence in the world and judges a greater need for violent re-
sponse than would most persons in the same situation. It is a bias
that can frequently be traced to violent cultures. Living in a com-
see also Matthew P. Spackman et al., An Analysis of the Effects of Subjective and Objective Instruc-
tion Forms on Mock Juries'Murder/Manslaughter Distinctions, 26 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 605 (2002)
(finding that use of EED versus more traditional provocation instruction had no effect on
outcomes in mock jury study).
50. Fontaine, supra note 3, at 30.
51. See generally ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE AND THE
MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY (1999); GEOFFREY CANADA, FIST STICK KNIFE GUN: A PER-
SONAL HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1995); JACK KATZ, THE SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME:
MORAL AND SENSUAL ATTRACTIONS IN DOING EVIL (1988); MARVIN E. IWOLFGANG & FRANCO
FERRACUTI, THE SUBCULTURE OF VIOLENCE (1967).
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munity in which violent threats are common and in which young
males are particularly at risk, a perceptive and reactive bias in favor
of violence is rational. It is adaptive. It is the code of the street.
52
The same dynamic holds true for male prison communities. But
should the prevalence of violence in a particular community,
should its culture of violence, reduce the punishment for a killing?
Is this a rule we want to generalize in the criminal law?
The psychological approach attempts to incorporate the scien-
tific insights of psychology and norms of capacity and character
analysis. My concerns with all of these were previously stated in the
discussion about criminal responsibility. But I can state my objec-
tion more simply: the psychological approach does not provide the
reliable, general moral norms that criminal law requires. At most
the psychological approach establishes a standard of averageness,
but averageness is not moral. The criminal law sets an expected
standard of conduct, a standard that in some instances will be
higher than the predicted behavior of many persons in a particular
community. If we permit averageness to be our standard, then
those communities which presently suffer the most violence will be
communities where the criminal law's sanction for violence will be
the most lenient. I do not think this is what criminal law should do.
B. Problem Cases I-Gender & Domestic Violence
The shortcomings of the psychological view of reasonableness
have been most extensively documented with respect to violence
against women. Donna Coker has written about how patriarchal
rage may be partially condoned by psychological understandings of
provocation. 4 Victoria Nourse has written more recently about how
male rage against separating female partners might support mitiga-
tion of punishment under the MPC, though there should be no
mitigation in such cases." The psychological approach might also
permit arguments for mitigation by persons especially threatened
52. See ANDERSON, supra note 51, at 32-34.
53. See, e.g., Kate King et al., Violence in the Supermax, A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 88 PRISON
J. 144,151 (2008).
54. Donna Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 So.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71 (1992).
55. Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform in the Provocation Defense, 106
YALE L.J. 1331 (1997). But see Kirschner, Bartlett & Galperin, supra note 43, at 116 (arguing
that based on survey of cases in one New York county, decision makers are unlikely to find
EED reasonable when it is based on male separation rage).
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by nonviolent homosexual advances, a position which has received
some criticism in the literature.5
Initially, consider male-female homicides inspired by a woman's
decision to separate from a male partner. We know from extensive
study of domestic violence that the most dangerous time for a
woman in an intimate relationship begins when the woman an-
nounces her intention to leave and continues through the early
stages of physical separation. During this time a significant number
of men experience overwhelming passion that inspires violence
against the departing partner. Such men appear to fit the profile of
individuals with a cognitive-emotive dysfunction. They experience
strong emotions that appear to leave them with, psychologically
speaking, reduced ability to choose nonviolent responses. The
male experience of rage may be traced to upbringing and culture,
causing the man to believe that his worth as a man depends on his
woman's loyalty, and that any breach of that loyalty must be pun-
ished.
Should such defendants receive the benefit of provocation? I
think not. Focusing on the reasons for these killings, we see homi-
cides committed out of patriarchal, jealous rage, killings that
should be categorized as murder not manslaughter.
There are other problem cases involving gender and homicide
in which the killer is female. I refer to cases in which an abuse vic-
tim, usually a woman, kills her abuser, but not in direct response to
serious abuse. Instead the homicide occurs well after the worst
abuse. If we are sympathetic to such defendants and believe they
should be candidates for provocation, current law presents signifi-
cant obstacles. Traditional provocation law does not work well
because of its insistence on a cooling off period and thus its reli-
ance on a male model of quick rage and attack. The abused female
who refrains from violent response until she finally can stand it no
more may exceed the time limits of the cooling off period.7 The
psychological view of reasonableness appears more attractive here
because of its elimination or modification of the timing require-
ment and, perhaps, broader view of the emotions eligible for the
heat of passion. But there is a hidden, practical difficulty. Recall
the averageness which seems to be the normative bottom line to
56. See Robert B. Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Ad-
vance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REv. 133 (1992); see also Bradford Bigler,
Comment, Sexually Provoked: Recognizing Sexual Misrepresentation as Adequate Provocation, 53
UCLA L. REv. 783 (2006). Cf Joshua Dressier, Mhen "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual"
Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the "Reasonable Man" Standard, 85 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 726 (1995).
57. See PILLSBURY, supra note 8, at 151-55.
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the psychological view of reasonableness. This standard may impli-
cate some very old and deep-rooted concepts of masculinity and
femininity. According to these concepts we expect men to external-
ize their reactions to injury in open anger and acts of violence, but
expect women to internalize their reactions in depression and sor-
rowY8 According to this view, a woman who reacts to a partner's
abuse with rage and violence seems abnormal .
C. Problem Cases Ill-Mental Illness
Discussion of the last set of problem cases must be brief because
it threatens to take us away from the most basic issues of provoca-
tion. These are cases involving mental illness, causing the
defendant to suffer diminished rationality at the time of homicide.
One of the aims of the MPC's EED rule was to include such cases as
potentially within the purview of mitigation. Indeed, I believe this
ambition to be the major cause of the rule's internal incoherence.
I believe that if we are to recognize a doctrine of diminished re-
sponsibility, it should be clearly distinct from that of provocation.60
A particularly appealing case for diminished responsibility might
be a homicide committed under the influence of postpartum de-
pression. We know of many instances in which women without any
history of criminality or violence suffer severe depression following
childbirth due to the enormous hormonal changes that come with
the conclusion of a pregnancy.6 Some suffer such a severe depres-
sion that they no longer care for their child and even seek its
death. The depression can sometimes cause psychosis, in which
case it may provide the basis for an insanity claim. 2 More often, the
woman will retain sufficient rationality to make the insanity de-
fense unlikely. But given the unexpected and situational nature of
58. See, e.g., Robin W. Simon & Leda E. Nath, Gender and Emotion in the United States: Do
Men and Women Differ in Self-Reports of Feelings and Expressive Behavior?, 109 Am. J. Soc. 1137
(2004).
59. Susan S. M. Edwards, Abolishing Provocation and Refraining Self-defense-the Law Com-
mission's Options for Reform, 2004 CRIM. L. REv. 181; Adrian Howe, Reforming Provocation (More
or Less), 12 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 127 (1999).
60. See also Dressier, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 1, at 985-89. For an
argument along similar lines dealing with English law and the need to distinguish between
provocation and diminished responsibility there, see James Chalmers, Merging Provocation
and Diminished Responsibility: Some Reasons for Scepticism, 2004 CRIM. L. Rzv. 198; Horder, supra
note 45.
61. See Abigail Wong, Filicide and Mothers Who Suffer from Postpartum Mental Disorders, 10
MICH. ST.J. MED. & L. 571 (2006).
62. See, e.g., Deborah Denno, Who Is Andrea Yates? A Short Story About Insanity, 10 DuKE
J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1 (2003).
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the condition and its powerfully distorting impact on thoughts and
feeling, perhaps the condition should support mitigation for the
homicide of an infant." Assuming this to be true, should this miti-
gation be found within the doctrine of provocation?
The temptation is to say yes. Provocation doctrine reduces a
murder charge to manslaughter, perhaps in accord with our intui-
tive reaction to the offense. It does so based on the profound effect
of strong emotion on the defendant's decision-making, which also
seems implicated here. The individual suffering from postpartum
depression seems one who is overwhelmed by emotion, leaving her
with a severely restricted capacity for lawful choice. The apparent
psychological similarity between these situations, however, masks
important normative differences.
As I have argued previously, provocation should mitigate pun-
ishment because the defendant had good reason for anger/fear
toward the victim. In postpartum depression, the defendant suffers
from irrationality manifested in hostility toward her infant that is
incomprehensible in ordinary human terms. She has no reason to
hate or feel threatened by her infant. She has no reason to despair
for the child's future. If the law is to provide mitigation here, that
mitigation must depend on the irrationality manifested in her
strong emotion. In diminished responsibility, mitigation comes
from the lack of any rational reason for defendant's hostility and
despair. In provocation, mitigation comes from our judgment that
the defendant's anger/fear was justified.64 Trying to accommodate
both of these situations in the same rule just invites confusion.
To sum up, this review of three types of problem cases indicates
serious inadequacies in the psychological approach to reasonable-
ness in provocation. Psychology simply does not provide reliable
norms to distinguish between the expectations of a particular sub-
culture and the moral norms of a society as a whole. It would
permit, though it would not require, mitigation for predictable
but, I would argue, socially unacceptable violent passions. 5 Finally,
if we are to recognize mitigation for diminished responsibility, we
should do so under a different rule than provocation.
63. For a recent argument supporting a diminished responsibility rule in the United
States, see Morse, supra note 31.
64. See Gardner, supra note 21, at 590-92.
65. Of course the traditional approach has its shortcomings as well. As I have argued
elsewhere, it also needs significant reform to prevent discrimination according to gender,
and also perhaps according to race and class. See PILLSBURY, supra note 8, at 155-59.
[VOL. 43:1
Misunderstanding Provocation
IV. ANALYZING EMOTION AND REASONS FOR ACTION
Professor Fontaine does not believe that provocation does or
should involve moral assessment of the defendant's emotion. His
position depends significantly on his original framing of the justifi-
cation/excuse distinction, which I have previously criticized. He
titles the section dealing with this argument: 'Justifiable Emotions
Do Not Make Justifiable Behaviors," making the argument that jus-
tified anger can never justify homicide.66 I quite agree, but do not
see how this furthers the discussion. Again, a legally provoked kill-
ing is a serious crime and therefore cannot be a justifiable behavior.
Does anyone argue otherwise?
Professor Fontaine also hints at more substantive reasons for his
rejection of normative analysis of emotion. He argues that emotion
is not a proper subject for criminal law's judgment. Initially he
suggests a categorical distinction between emotions, thoughts and
action; he considers only the last of these distinctions relevant to
criminal responsibility. "The distinction is that, because thinking
and feeling do not in and of themselves cause harm to others, one
should be free to think and feel as one likes, but the same, of
course, cannot be said of behavior."6'7 Here Professor Fontaine's
choice of words is revealing. Strictly speaking, criminal law does
not judge behavior, but action."
We punish for chosen wrongful actions, not just behavior with
harmful consequences. We punish-or do not-according to the
reasons for which persons act, reasons which we ascertain by read-
ing human action in context. We interpret conduct according to a
wealth of human experience with choice, which includes a wealth
of understanding about thoughts and emotions. Similarly, how
could we engage in mens rea analysis or analysis of affirmative de-
fenses without considering what the defendant aimed to
accomplish or what he or she knew or was aware of? All of these
implicate the defendant's thoughts about his action. How could we
reliably judge mens rea or affirmative defenses without considering
the emotions that drive most human action, including criminal
66. Fontaine, supra note 3, at 46.
67. Id. at 49.
68. Behavior is the preferred term in psychology because it is a nonjudgmental refer-
ence to observable conduct. It does not, by itself, differentiate the human animal from other
creatures whose conduct can be observed and analyzed. Criminal law of course is concerned
with passing judgment on human action and only makes sense for humans.
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conduct? Criminal law that excludes consideration of a person's
thought or emotion would be literally unrecognizable. 69
The same is true of any moral reasoning. Scholars may be skilled
at discussing moral issues without (apparent) expression of or reli-
ance on emotion, but that does not mean that emotions can finally
be separated from morals. Professor Fontaine suggests, particularly
in his footnote criticizing Hume, that in moral analysis emotion is
epiphenomenal. He suggests that moral cognition-ideas about
morals-precedes feelings about morals (emotions). But is that
true?70 Here, as elsewhere in his article, Professor Fontaine treats as
separate and distinguishable parts of the human experience that
are, in my experience, inextricably intertwined. It strikes me as
equally plausible, per Hume and Adam Smith (among others), that
our moral sense normally originates in our feelings.71
This is not to say that emotion determines morals. But most
moral positions begin with feeling, with a sense of right and wrong
that then is made articulate by deliberative reasoning. I suspect this
is as true for criminal law scholars as for anyone else. Moral reason-
ing does not end here; discussion and further deliberation about
morality can change our ideas-and feelings.72 Reason may alter
emotion. The point is that our moral sense involves all of our per-
ceptive and deliberative faculties, which absolutely include
emotions.
As both critics and supporters of retribution have noted, a great
deal of the moral impetus behind criminal law comes from emo-
tional reactions to wrongdoing. P. F. Strawson famously argued that
69. An obvious example is premeditation, with its concern with deliberation and cool-
ness. Another example is self-defense, where emotions and cognitions are central. More
basically, we can only ascertain mens rea by reading the defendant's action in light of our
background understanding of human experience, an understanding which includes our
most intellectualized and deliberative faculties, but including our most emotional and intui-
tive.
70. Fontaine, supra note 3, at 48 n.67. At a minimum, the distinction suggested by Pro-
fessor Fontaine between thought, emotion and action requires more definitional work to
support the normative argument presented.
71. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1965) (1888);
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (Univ. C. London 1903) (1759). For
more contemporary approaches, see RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION
(1987); ROBERT C. SOLOMON, THE PASSIONS: THE MYTHS AND NATURE OF HUMAN NOTION
(1976). For the intersection of psychology and law relating to emotion, see NORMAN J.
FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAW (1995). For an intriguing
and wide ranging essay on emotion, philosophy and retribution, see Theodore Y. Blumoff,
Some Thoughts on the Aesthetics of Retribution, 17 CANADIANJ. L. &JURISP. 233 (2004).
72. Though I recognize this is more the exception than the rule. More often, when
one intellectual argument fails to justify our feelings we prefer to develop new intellectual
arguments in support rather than change our feelings. Making this point in a characteristi-
cally vigorous fashion is Ron Allen, Moral Choices, Moral Truth and the Eighth Amendment, 31
HARV.J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 25 (2008).
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the reactive emotions-the emotions inspired by wrongful acts-are
essentially constitutive of ourjudgments of responsibility.7 3 Bypassing
the usual dialectics of free will, Strawson argued that because we feel
anger and upset at injustice, we create responsibility to assuage those
feelings through nonviolent response. Reactive emotions are natural
to the human condition. To imagine intelligent beings who do not
react emotionally to wrongdoing against themselves or loved ones is
to imagine a species that lacks a fundamental trait of humanity.
Emotion's influence on decision-making is not uniformly good
or bad. Neither can it be generally eliminated or suppressed. Emo-
tion's influence is instead normatively complex and nearly
ubiquitous. Justice according to law requires emotive analysis and
regulation, tasks that demand careful attention to language, con-
text and norms.
Language poses a challenge to emotive regulation because our
standard vocabulary distinguishes emotion types but not their
normative basis. In this respect our language of emotion is more
psychological than moral. Labels such as anger or fear or sadness
say nothing about the source of the anger or fear or sadness, about
whether they are-or to what extent they are-justified. For exam-
ple, anger can be justified or unjustified; the former might support
mitigation in provocation while the latter might be a key to proving
a hate crime. These linguistic difficulties are not insurmountable,
of course. In fashioning criminal law, we often develop specialized
terms and phrases to respect normative distinctions missed by or-
dinary language. It just means that if we are to take explicit notice
of emotions and criminal law-and I think sometimes we must-
then we must be equally explicit about the need for normative
analysis of those emotions.
In conclusion, I see no reason why assessing reasons for emotion
should present insurmountable problems for criminal adjudica-
tion. In provocation, the assessment of emotion is essentially an
assessment of motivation. The presence of strong emotion is not
usually a point of controversy; what is contested is the source of-
the justification or excuse for-that strong emotion. Analyzing
whether a strong emotion is justified, as I believe doctrine should
require, at most represents a redescription of a task that provocation
73. P.E Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREE WILL 59-80 (Gary Watson ed., 1982).
74. These are common themes in the contemporary literature on law, philosophy and
emotion. For an introduction to the literature, see Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 16; Terry
Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 3 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 119
(2006). See aso THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes ed., 1999).
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has performed for centuries. To the extent that motive analysis is
controversial, that must be a subject for another day.7
V. CONCLUSION
The most serious issue with respect to provocation today is
whether the doctrine should survive. Arguments for its elimination
based on its pro-violence and pro-patriarchy tendencies have led to
76its abolition in two Australian states. Its elimination has been ac-
tively considered elsewhere.7 Were it not for the severity of
penalties for murder in this country, which I believe to be excessive
in some cases, I might also support provocation's demise. But I also
believe that there will always be some cases where the defendant's
justified anger/fear should support lesser punishment and that
this distinction is important enough to make it the basis for a liabil-
ity determination (guilty or not guilty) rather than leaving it to the
discretion of a sentencing judge.
Assuming we retain provocation, we need to be clearer about its
norms. The modern trend to make reasonableness a more indi-
vidualized and psychological concept is in my view inconsistent
with the basic legal needs of a highly heterogeneous society. For
criminal law to do its basic political and social work in responding
to criminal homicide, we need provocation rules that provide
clearer normative guidance than the psychological approach does
or can provide.
In closing, I want to express one final frustration with the state
of current legal scholarship about provocation. It concerns meth-
odology. Particularly in the United States, the discussion about
provocation often proceeds at a high level of abstraction, drawing
on philosophical concepts and methods to ascertain the law's na-
ture and to describe (prescribe?) its rationale. As is true of so
much contemporary American legal scholarship, the assumption is
75. I have argued that motive analysis represents just another, albeit more ambitious
form of reason analysis similar to that required by standard mens rea forms-a difference
more of degree than of kind. See PILLSBURY, supra note 8, at 82-83, 110-24. For arguments
supportive of motive in determining criminal responsibility, see Guyora Binder, The Culpabil-
ity of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965 (2008) (justifying felony murder in part
based on motive analysis); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive's Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S.
CAL. L. REv. 89 (2006). For a more critical account distinguishing between motive in offense
definition and excuses from liability, see Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observa-
tions on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635.
76. See Forell, supra note 45, at 52-59.
77. See id.; Helen Brown, Provocation as a Defense to Murder: To Abolish or to Reform?, 12
AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 137 (1999); Edwards, supra note 59; Howe, supra note 59; see also
HORDER, supra note 7, at 186-97; Dressier, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 1.
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that good theory will produce good law. I do not doubt that this
can be true. But I think that working in the opposite direction will
be more fruitful.
For example, in provocation we scholars might devote more at-
tention to discussion of paradigm cases. What might serve as
central, concrete examples of provocation today? Traditionally
these examples have arguably been more influential in setting the
doctrine's parameters than have general rule statements. This sug-
gests that our efforts might be more productive in describing such
paradigm cases rather than worrying about jurisprudential catego-
ries, which courts and legislatures generally ignore. Why are
unlawful arrest and discovery of adultery still presented in cases
and other materials as paradigmatic examples of this doctrine?
What are the instances of provocation on which we can all agree
today? If we are to keep this doctrine, I think we must decide on
paradigm cases that fit contemporary values. For myself, I believe
such cases would center on provoking acts of physical violence and
violation of sexual autonomy. Others may see the matter differ-
ently.
Finally, the discussion of provocation should be informed by a
better understanding of legal reality. We need more empirical work
on how the doctrine is currently understood and applied. How do
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges and juries evaluate cases in
terms of heat of passion? We need studies of plea bargains, trial
outcomes, and sentencing.7v A great deal of legal scholarship, my
own included, depends on speculation about practice based on a
small number of published appellate decisions. This is a weak
foundation for legal reform.
78. For a good example of such work, see Kirschner, Bartlett & Galperin, supra note
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